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1Anonymous Single Sign-on with Proxy
Re-Verification
Jinguang Han, Senior Member, IEEE, Liqun Chen, Member, IEEE, Steve Schneider, Helen Treharne,
Stephan Wesemeyer and Nick Wilson
Abstract—An anonymous Single Sign-on (ASSO) scheme al-
lows users to access multiple services anonymously using one
credential. We propose a new ASSO scheme, where users can
access services anonymously through the use of anonymous
credentials and unlinkably through the provision of designated
verifiers. Notably, verifiers cannot link a user’s service requests
even if they collude. The novelty is that when a designated
verifier is unavailable, a central authority can authorise new
verifiers to authenticate the user on behalf of the original verifier.
Furthermore, a central verifier can also be authorised to de-
anonymise users and trace their service requests. We formalise
the scheme along with a security proof and provide an empirical
evaluation of its performance. This scheme can be applied to
smart ticketing where minimising the collection of personal
information of users is increasingly important to transport
organisations due to privacy regulations such as General Data
Protection Regulations (GDPR).
Index Terms—Proxy Verification, Anonymous Authentication,
Designated Verification, Service Disruption
I. INTRODUCTION
S INGLE Sign-on (SSO) is a mechanism that enables auser to access multiple services using only one credential.
Existing SSO solutions include OpenID [1], SAML [2], and
Kerberos [3], etc. SSO systems can reduce a user’s burden on
maintaining authentication credentials.
In order to protect users’ privacy, anonymous SSO (ASSO)
systems were proposed in [4]–[7]. In these systems, a user’s
personal identifiable information (PII) was considered, but the
unlinkability of the user’s service requests was not. Recently,
Han et al. [8] proposed a new ASSO scheme which protects
the identity of both the user and her service requests. Their
scheme allows users to obtain a ticket from a ticket issuer to
access multiple intended services. The ticket consists of a set
of authentication tags that can only be validated by designated
verifiers. Designated verifiers can validate their corresponding
tags and cannot link a user’s service requests, even if they
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collude. A third party, referred to as a central verifier, can
de-anonymise a user’s identity and trace her service requests.
In a transport application a ticket could represent an in-
tended route of travel (e.g. from A to B to C). Traditionally,
in the rail industry, tickets were paper based and hence
anonymous. In the context of smart ticketing, which is one
of the main digital strategies of the UK rail industry [9],
customers’ data may be stored when buying tickets. Thus, it
will be important to consider passenger privacy in order to
minimise the collection of personal information to reflect the
requirements of the recently introduced General Data Protec-
tion Regulations (GDPR) [10]. Nonetheless, a smart ticketing
solution will still need to provide guarantees as to who owns
and uses a rail ticket. Using an anonymous scheme such
as Han et al. [8] means that passenger information leakage
between different companies is prevented because each train
operating company is considered to be a separate designated
verifier. However, the inclusion of a central verifier allows the
relevant transport authorities to identify passengers and their
journeys. This is important in the case of an emergency to
enable transport authorities to know who the passengers using
their transport systems are. It could also provide guards on
a train access a user’s whole journey information in order to
provide the best journey advice during travel if appropriate.
In [8], an authentication tag can only be validated by a
designated service provider, hence a user cannot access the
services if the service provider is off-line or unavailable. In a
cloud environment and when a service provider is off-line, a
user would expect to be redirected to an alternative provider
offering a similar service. While for a transport application
(in the case of disruption), a ticket should still be valid and
authorised for use on a redirected route. For example, a journey
from A to C via B could be redirected to go via D and/or
E when B is disrupted. In such cases a user should not be
required to buy or change her ticket in order to access the
alternative route. Moreover, in practice, the entities who hold
the disruption information are disconnected from those who
sell tickets. Therefore, rail authorities and train companies
should manage and be responsible for the redirected travel
routes and disruption information with minimal impact on
users.
In this paper, we propose a new ASSO scheme which
extends the scheme presented in [8] to allow a central authority
to authorise another verifier to act as a proxy and validate the
authentication tags for a service provider that is unavailable.
In the ticket scenario it thus provides a central authority
with the ability to allow a proxy verifier to validate a user’s
2ticket. Hence, proxy re-verification does not increase a user’s
authentication burden in case of a disruption, i.e. a user does
not need to change her ticket. Our new scheme also preserves
the following features from the original scheme of Han et
al. [8]:
1) Multiple Access: a user can use one ticket to access
multiple distinct services;
2) Anonymity: a user can obtain a ticket from a ticket issuer
without releasing anything about her PII to the ticket
issuer, especially, the ticket issuer cannot determine
whether two ticket are issued to the same user or two
different users;
3) Unlinkability: a designated verifier can determine
whether a user is authorised to access its service but
cannot link a user’s different service requests nor collude
with other verifiers to link a user’s service requests;
4) Unforgeability: tickets can only be issued by ticket
issuers and cannot be forged by other parties even the
central authority;
5) Traceability: only the central verifier can de-anonymise
a user and trace the identities of the verifiers whose
services the user is authorised to access;
6) Double Spending Detection: designated verifiers can de-
tect and prevent a user from making two authentication
requests using the same authentication tag but cannot
de-anonymise the user;
Contributions: Our main contributions in this paper are sum-
marised as follows: (1) an ASSO with proxy re-verification
scheme providing the above features is formally constructed;
(2) the definition and security model are formalised; (3) the
scheme has been implemented and an empirical efficiency
analysis is presented; (4) the security of our scheme is formally
reduced to well-known complexity assumptions.
The novelty of this paper is to prevent information leakage
across multiple verifiers and implement proxy re-verification.
To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first scheme
to support users anonymously and unlinkably authenticating
to multiple service providers and allowing authorised proxy
verifiers to verify authentication on behalf of an original
designated verifier when that verifier is unavailable.
A. Related Work
In this subsection, we review the work which is most
closely related to our scheme. Previous authentication schemes
mainly address the anonymity of users and implement multiple
authentications using one credential.
1) Anonymous Single-Sign-On schemes: Elmufti et al. [4]
proposed an ASSO scheme which is suitable to the Global
System for Mobile communication (GSM). In [4], to access a
service, a user needs to generate a new one-time identity and
uses it to authenticate to a trusted third party (TTP). If the
authentication is successful, the TTP forwards the user’s one-
time identity to the service provider who provides the service.
As a result, the service provider cannot infer the user’s real
identity from this one-time identity. However, in our scheme,
users can authenticate to service providers directly without the
need of a TTP.
Han et al. [5] proposed a generic construction of dynamic
SSO schemes where digital signature, broadcast encryption
and zero-knowledge proof are adopted. In [5], after registering
with the system, a user obtains a credential which is the
encryption of a signature generated by the central authority
on a set of service selected by the user and her public key.
Consequently, only the service providers whose services have
been selected by the user can decrypt the ciphertext and
validate the signature. To prevent sharing a credential, a user
needs to prove the knowledge of her secret key corresponding
to the public key included in the credential. Hence, a user is
anonymous only to the service providers who are not included
in the credential. Nevertheless, unlike in our scheme, service
providers know the user’s identity (public key) and link her
service requests.
Wang et al. [6] proposed an ASSO scheme based on group
signatures [11]. When registering to the central authority,
a user is issued a group member key. Then, to access a
service, a user generates a group signature by using her group
member key. A service provider checks whether the user is
authorised to access services by validating the correctness
of the signature. Furthermore, the central authority can use
the open algorithm in the group signature scheme to trace a
user’s identity. Notably, a user can access all services in the
system, while in our scheme a user can only access the selected
services.
Lee [7] proposed an efficient ASSO scheme based on
Chebyshev Chaotic Maps. When joining the system, an issuer
(the smart card processing center) issues temporary secret keys
to users and service providers. To access a service, a user
interacts with a service provider to generate a session key by
using their respective temporary secret keys. A service request
is granted if and only if the session key can be generated
correctly; otherwise, the request is denied. However, unlike
our scheme, each service provider knows the identity of the
user accessing his service. Hence, multiple service providers
can profile a user’s service requests if they collude. Moreover,
a user can again access all services in the system, while in
our scheme a user can only access the selected services.
2) Proxy Re-Encryption: Mambo and Okamoto [12] in-
troduced the definition of proxy cryptosystems that enable
a delegator to delegate the decryption power to a delegatee.
Later, Blaze [13] proposed an atomic proxy cryptography
scheme where a semi-trusted third party called proxy can
convert ciphertexts for one user into ciphertexts for another
user if the third party is given a proxy key.
Shamir [14] introduced an identity-based cryptosystem is a
public key cryptosystem where a user’s public key can be any
arbitrary string and her secret key is obtained from a trusted
central authority. Boneh and Franklin [15] first proposed a
practical identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme based on
paring. Green and Ateniese [16] introduced the concept of
identity-based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) where a proxy can
convert a ciphertext for the original decryptor to a ciphertext
for a designated decryptor if the proxy obtains a re-encryption
key from the original decrytor. Han et al. [17] classified
IBPRE schemes into two types according to the generation
of re-encryption keys: (1) re-encryption keys are generated by
3the trusted central authority [18], [19]; (2) re-encryption keys
are generated by the original decryptors [16], [20]. In [16],
[18]–[20], given a re-encryption key, a proxy can convert all
ciphertexts for the original decryptor to ciphertexts for the
designated decryptor. The differences between our scheme and
IBPRE schemes are: (1) a proxy is not required; (2) a re-key
only enables a proxy verifier to validate tickets on behalf the
original verifier in a specified period, instead of all tags.
3) Designated Verifier Schemes: Jakobsson et al. [21] in-
troduced a designated verifier signature (DVS) scheme which
is a digital signature scheme where a signature can only
be verified by a single designated verifier. Furthermore, the
verifier cannot convince others that a signature is from the
real signer since the verifier could have generated the signature
by himself. Fan et al. [22] presented an attribute-based DVS
scheme where a signature can be verified by a group of veri-
fiers whose attributes satisfies specified values. In our scheme,
we adopt the high level concept of a designated verifier,
i.e. given a valid authentication tag, only the corresponding
designated verifier and the authorised proxy verifiers can
validate it. The main difference between these DVS schemes
[21], [22] and our scheme is that only the designated verifiers
can verify a signature in DVS schemes, while in our scheme,
everyone can verify a tag’s signature generated by the ticket
issuer but only the designated verifier of the tag can determine
for whom it was generated.
Kuchta et al. [23] proposed an identity-based strong des-
ignated verifier group signature (ID-SDVGS) scheme that can
provide the features of both designated verifier signatures and
identity-based group signatures. In this scheme, all entities
must obtain secret keys from a trusted third party referred
to as “private key generator” (PKG). When joining the group,
each user obtains a member credential from the group manager
(GM). Then, a user can use her credential to anonymously
generate a signature which can only be verified by the desig-
nated verifier and can be opened/de-anonymized by the GM.
The verifier cannot convince others that the signature is from
the real signer since the verifier can generate the signature by
himself. However, in our scheme, only the secret keys of ticket
verifiers are issued by the central authority. The secret keys of
other entities including the ticket issuer, users and the central
verifier are generated by themselves. Authentication tags can
only be generated by the ticket issuer and its correctness can
be publicly verified. Nevertheless, other entities cannot know
for whom a tag is generated except the designated verifier.
4) k-time Anonymous Authentication Schemes: Anony-
mous authentication schemes enable a user to authenticate to
a verifier without releasing her PII to the verifier. To limit
the authentication time, Teranishi et al. [24] proposed a k-
time anonymous authentication (k-TAA) scheme where users
register with a central authority and obtain an anonymous
credential. A verifier generates k authentication tags. For each
access, a user proves to the verifier that she has obtained a
valid credential from the central authority and selects a fresh
authentication tag. As a result, no party can identify a user if
she authenticates no more than k times, while any party can
identify a user if she authenticates more than k times. In [24],
the central authority decides a user’s access permission and
service verifiers do not have control on the access permissions.
Camenisch et al. [25] proposed a periodic k-TAA scheme
where a user can anonymously authenticate herself to a service
verifier no more than k times in a given time period. The
authentication tags automatically refresh every time period.
When a user makes an anonymous authentication request, she
proves to a verifier that she has obtained a valid credential (CL
signature [26]) from the central authority. Lastly, Camenisch
et al. proposed an identity mixer scheme [27], [28] in which
users need to obtain a credential for their attributes. To access
a service, a user proves to the service verifier that she has the
required attributes.
In all these schemes [24], [25], [27]–[29], authentication is
not bound to a particular verifier, whereas in our scheme an
authentication tag can only be verified by a designated verifier.
Furthermore, k-TAA schemes allow verifiers to de-anonymise
a user’s identity when she has authenticated more than k times,
while in our scheme a service verifier can detect whether a user
has used the tag (double spending) but cannot de-anonymise
a user’s identity. Notably, our scheme allows a central verifier
to de-anonymise a user and trace her service requests.
In Table I, we compare our scheme with related ASSO
schemes in terms of anonymity, the inclusion of a designated
verifier, traceability, re-verification, whether a trusted third
party (TTP) is required to authenticate users on behalf of
service provers as well as efficiency which mainly considers
whether bilinear groups are required or not.
B. Paper Organisation
The remainder of this paper is organised in the following
sections. Section II provides a high-level overview of our
scheme and its security requirements. Section III introduces
the formal definition and security model. Section IV presents
the preliminaries for our scheme and a formal construction of
our scheme is given in Section V. Section VI and Section VII
present the security proof and the performance evaluation of
our scheme, respectively. Finally, Section VIII concludes the
paper.
II. SCHEME OVERVIEW AND SECURITY PROPERTIES
The notation used throughout this paper is summarised in
Table II.
Our ASSO with proxy re-verification scheme consists of the
following entities:
• a trusted central authority, CA, which initialises the
system, issues credentials to other entities in the scheme
and authorises proxy verification;
• a user, U, who wants to access some distinct services
anonymously and unlinkabily;
• a ticket issuer, I, issues tickets to registered, yet anony-
mous users for a set of selected services;
• a designated verifier, V, who can only validate the
authentication tags generated for him and cannot link a
user’s service requests;
• an authentication tag, TagV , which is bound to a user U
and a designated verifier V and is used to convince V
that U is authorised to access its service;
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THE COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR SCHEME AND RELATED SCHEMES
Schemes Anonymity Designated Verifiers Traceability Re-Verification Trusted Third Party (TTP) Efficiency (bilinear group)
Elmufti et al. [4] X × X × X ×
Han et al. [5] × × X × × not applicable
Wang et al. [6] X × X × × not applicable
Lee [7] X × × × × ×
Han et al. [8] X X X × × X
Our Scheme X X X X × X
TABLE II
NOTATION SUMMARY
Notation Explanations Notation Explanations
1` A security parameter Vi The i-th ticket verifier
CA Central authority JU The service set of U consisting of the
I Ticket issuer identities of ticket verifiers & IDCV
V Ticket verifier PP Public parameters
U User PsU A set of pseudonyms of U
CV Central verifier PsV The pseudonym generated for V
IDI The identity of I TagV An authentication tag for V
IDV The identity of V TagCV An authentication tag for CV
IDU The identity of U TU A ticket issued to U
IDCV The identity of CV |X | The cardinality of the set X
 (`) A negligible function in ` x R← X x is randomly selected from the set X
σI The credential of I A(x) → y y is computed by running the
σV The credential of V algorithm A(·) with input x
σU The credential of U KG(1` ) A secret-public key pair generation algorithm
σCV The credential of CV BG(1` ) A bilinear group generation algorithm
MSK Master Secret Key PPT Probable polynomial-time
H1, H2, H3 Cryptographic hash functions p A prime number
• a ticket, TU , which consists of a set of authentication
tags generated for the designated verifiers of the requested
services;
• a central verifier, CV, which is another trusted third party
which, given a ticket TU , can de-anonymise the identities
of the user and trace her service requests.
A. Overview of proposed scheme
A simplified pictorial description of our scheme is presented
in Fig. 1. CA initialises the system. When joining the system,
I, U, V and CV authenticate to the CA and obtain their
credentials from CA. To buy a ticket, U sends her service
information JU consisting of a set of verifiers’ identities IDV
to I. Subsequently, I generates a ticket TU for U. The ticket
comprises a set of tags TU = {TagV |IDV ∈ JU } ∪ {TagCV }
which can only be validated by the corresponding desig-
nated verifiers. When being validated by V, U sends the
corresponding tag TagV to V. In the case that U’s service
information needs to be traced, CV is allowed to trace the
whole service information of U given a ticket TU . Especially,
when the original verifier V is unavailable, CA can authorise
a new verifier V ′ to validate the tag on behalf of V.
B. Security Properties of Our Scheme
Having defined the different entities and described how they
interact, we now list the security properties of our scheme:
Anonymity: a user can obtain a ticket from a ticket issuer
anonymously;
Unlinkability: a designated verifier cannot link a user’s differ-
ent service requests nor collude with other verifiers to link a
user’s service requests;
Unforgeability: tickets are generated by ticket issuers and
cannot be forged by other parties even the central authority;
Traceability: given a valid ticket, CV can de-anonymise the
ticket holder and trace her service requests;
Proxy Re-verification: in the case that a designated verifier V
is unavailable, CA can assign one or more verifiers V ′ to
validate a user’s tag designated for V;
Double Spending: a designated verifier can detect whether a
tag has been used or not, but cannot de-anonymise the user.
III. FORMAL DEFINITION AND SECURITY REQUIREMENT
In this section, we review the formal definition and security
requirement of ASSO with proxy re-verification. The formal
definition of ASSO with proxy re-verification is defined using
a series of algorithms and is given in the full version of this
paper (see Section III in [30]).
A. Security Requirements
The security model of our scheme is defined by the follow-
ing three games.
Unforgeability. This is used to define the unforgeability
of tickets, namely even if users, verifiers and the central
verifier collude, they cannot forge a valid ticket. This game
is formalised in the full version (see Section III in [30]).
Unlinkability. This is used to define the unlinkability,
namely even if some ticket verifiers collude with potential
users, they cannot profile the whole service information of
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Fig. 1: Pictorial description of our scheme
other users. We assume that I and CV cannot be com-
promised because they can know a user’s whole service
information by themselves. The game is formalised in the full
version (see Section III in [30]).
Traceability. This is used to formalise the traceability of
tickets, namely even if a group of users collude, they cannot
generate a ticket which CV would not catch as belonging to
some member of the colluding group. We suppose that the
ticket issuer is honest. This game is formalised in the full
version (see Section III in [30]).
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the preliminaries used in this paper are
introduced.
A. Bilinear Group
Let G1, G2 and Gτ be cyclic groups with prime order p. A
map e : G1 ×G2 → Gτ is a bilinear map/pairing if it satisfies
the following properties [15]: (1) Bilinearity: For all g ∈ G1,
h ∈ G2 and x, y ∈ Zp , e(gx, hy) = e(gy, hx) = e(g, h)xy; (2)
Non-degeneration: For all g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2, e(g, h) , 1τ
where 1τ is the identity element in Gτ ; (3) Computability:
For all g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2, there exists an efficient algorithm
to compute e(g, h).
Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G1,G2,Gτ) be a bilinear group genera-
tor which takes as input a security parameter 1` and outputs a
bilinear group (e, p,G1,G2,Gτ). Bilinear maps can be divided
into three types [31]: Type-I: G1 = G2; Type-II: G1 , G2 but
there exist an efficient map: φ : G2 → G1; Type-III: G1 , G2
but there is no efficient map between G1 and G2. Type-III
pairings are the most efficient pairings [32]. Our scheme is
based on Type-III pairings where the size of elements in G1
is short (160 bits).
B. Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1: (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption [33])
Let G be a cyclic group with prime order p and g be a
generator of G. Given Y ∈ G, we say that the DL assumption
holds on G if all PPT adversaries can output a number
x ∈ Zp such that Y = gx with a negligible advantage, namely
AdvDLA = Pr [Y = gx |A(p, g,G,Y ) → x] ≤ (`).
The proof of the traceability property of our scheme is reduced
to the DL assumption.
Definition 2: (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
Assumption [15]) Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G,Gτ) where G1 =
G2 = G and g be a generator of G. Suppose that a, b, c
R← Zp .
Given a tuple T = (g, ga, gb, gc,Υ), we say that the DBDH
assumption holds on (e, p,G,Gτ) if all PPT adversary A can
distinguish Υ = e(g, g)abc from a random element R ∈ Gτ
with a negligible advantage, namely AdvDBDHA =
 Pr[A(T,
Υ = e(g, g)abc) = 1] − Pr[A(T,Υ = R) = 1]
 ≤ (`).
The security of the Boneh-Franklin IBE used to implement
flexible verification was reduced to the DBDH assumption.
Definition 3: (Decisional asymmetric Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (DaBDH) Assumption [32]) Let BG(1`) → (e, p,
G1,G2,Gτ) and g, g be generators of G1 and G2, respectively.
Suppose that a, b, c
R← Zp . Given a tuple T = (g, g, ga, gb, gc,
gb, gc,Υ), we say that the DaBDH assumption holds on (e, p,
G1,G2,Gτ) if all PPT adversaries can distinguish Υ = e(g,
g)abc from a random element R ∈ Gτ with a negligible
advantage, namely AdvDaBDHA =
 Pr[A(T,Υ = e(g, g)abc) =
1] − Pr[A(T,Υ = R) = 1]
 ≤ (`).
The DaBDH assumption is used to prove the unlinkablity
of our scheme.
Definition 4: ((JoC Version) q-Strong Diffie-Hellman
(JoC-q-SDH) Assumption [34]) Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G1,G2,
Gτ). Given a (q + 3)-tuple (g, gx, · · · , gxq , g, gx) ∈ Gq+11 × G22,
we say that the JoC-q-SDH assumption holds on (e, p,G1,G2,
6Gτ) if all PPT adversaries A can output (c, g 1x+c ) ∈ Zp ×
G1 with a negligible advantage, namely Adv
JOC-q-SDH
A =
Pr
[
(c, g 1x+c ) ← A(g, gx, · · · , gxq , g, gx)
]
≤ (`), where c ∈
Zp \ {−x}.
The unforgeability of our scheme is reduced to the JoC-q-
SDH assumption.
C. Zero-Knowledge Proof
We follow the definition introduced by Camenish and
Stadler in [35] and formalised by Camenish et al. in [36].
By PoK:{(x1, x2, x3) : Υ = gx1hx2 ∧ Υ˜ = gx1hx3 }, we
denote a zero knowledge proof on knowledge of integers x1,
x2 and x3 such that Υ = gx1hx2 and Υ˜ = gx1hx3 hold on
the groups G = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉 and G˜ = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉, respectively.
The convention is that the letters in the parenthesis (x1, x2, x3)
stand for the knowledge which is being proven, while the other
parameters are known by the verifier.
D. BBS+ Signature
This signature was proposed by Au et al. [37]. Its security
was reduced to the q-SDH assumption in Type-II pairing
setting in [37]. Recently, Camenisch et al. [38] reduced its
security to the JoC-q-SDH assumption in Type-III pairing
setting.
Theorem 1: (Camenisch et al. [38])The BBS+ signature
is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message
attacks (EU-CMA) if the JoC-q-SDH assumption holds on the
bilinear group (e, p,G1,G2,Gτ).
E. Boneh-Franklin Identity-Based Encryption
Boneh and Franklin [15] proposed the first IBE scheme
based on the Type-I pairing: e : G × G→ Gτ .
Theorem 2: (Boneh and Franklin [15]) This IBE scheme
is secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) if the DBDH
assumption holds on the bilinear map group (e, p,G,Gτ).
Abdalla et al. [39] observed that Boneh-Franklin IBE [15] is
an anonymous IBE scheme where ciphertext does not release
the identity of the receiver. Chatterjee and Menezes [32] trans-
ferred Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme from Type-I pairing setting
to Type-III pairing setting, and claimed that the security of the
transferred scheme can be reduced to DaBDH assumption. In
this paper, the Boneh-Franklin [15] IBE scheme is applied to
implement proxy re-verification.
V. CONSTRUCTION OF OUR SCHEME
A. Formal Construction
The formal construction of our ASSO with proxy re-
verification scheme including messages sent between its en-
tities and their relevant computations is presented in Fig. 2,
Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. Notably, Fig.
7 and Fig. 8 are new in our scheme compared to Han et al. ’s
construction in [8] and Fig. 3, Fig. 4 have been modified to
reflect the IBPRE scheme used.
B. High-Level Overview
At a high level, our scheme works as follows.
Setup. CA initializes the system and generates a master secret
key MSK = (α, β) and the corresponding public parameters
PP. Actually, α is used to issue credentials to I, U and CV
when they join the system, while β is used to issue secret keys
to Vs.
Registration. When joining the system, I, U and CV
generate their secret-public key pairs (xi,YI, Y˜I ), (xu,YU ) and
(xcv,YCV ), and register with the CA by sending their identities
(IDI, IDU, IDCV ) and public keys ((YI, Y˜I ),YU,YCV ), respec-
tively. Finally, I, U and CV obtain their credentials (di, ei,
σI ), (du, eu, σU ) and (dcv, ecv, σCV ) from CA, respectively.
Note, (di, ei, σI ), (du, eu, σU ) and (dcv, ecv, σCV ) are generated
by CA using the master secret key α and are BBS+ signatures
on the public keys YI , YU and YCV , respectively. When joining
the system, Vs only submit their identities to CA. CA uses
the master secret key β to generate a secret key SKV for the
identity IDV of V. This is one of the main differences in the
scheme’s construction compared to Han et al. [8] where the
verifiers generate their own secret-public key pairs. Moving
this generation to the CA is required to facilitate the proxy re-
verification. Furthermore, the CA generates a credential (dv,
ev, σV ) for V which is a BBS+ signature on IDV . CV stores
((dv, ev, σV ), SKV ), and sends them to V.
Ticket Issuing. To buy a ticket, U determines her service
information JU consisting of the identities of the correspond-
ing V whose services U wants to access. Furthermore, for
each IDV ∈ JU , U generates a pseudonym (PV ,QV ) using
her secret key and proves to I that she is a registered user
and the pseudonyms are generated correctly (
∏1
U ). If the proof
is correct, for each IDV ∈ JU , I generates an authentication
tag TagV = ((PV ,QV ), (E1V , E2V , E3V ,KV ,Text1,Text2), (sv,wv,
zv, ZV )). Within the tag (E1V , E2V ) are used by V to validate
TagV while (E1V , E2V , E3V ) are used by a proxy verifier V ′ to
validate TagV on behalf of V in a specified time period TP.
Since TP is embedded in E3V it is used to restrict the time
of proxy re-verification to reflect that time period. In a rail
application, a TP could be the travel day printed on the ticket
(e.g. September 1, 2018) and can be decided by the ticket
issuer.
Additionally, within the tag ((PV ,QV ), E2V ,KV ) are used
by CV to de-anonymize U’s identity and trace her service
requests. Note also that sv is the serial number of TagV
and (wv, zv, ZV ) is a BBS+ signature on sv . To prevent U
from combing the authentication tags in different tickets,
I generates another BBS+ signature (w, z, Z) on the ticket
issue number s = H1(s1 | |s2 | | · · · | |s |JU |). The ticket is TU =
{TagV |IDV ∈ JU } ∪ (s,w, z, Z).
Ticket Validation. When validating a ticket, V sends its
identity IDV toU.U selects the corresponding tag TagV , and
then sends it to V with a proof of the knowledge (∏2U ) of the
secrets included in the pseudonyms (PV ,QV ). V validates the
tag TagV by checking the proof and the signature. However, in
the case that U needs to confirm whether V is a designated
verifier, V sends IDV and his credential (dv, ev, σV ) to U.
Then, U checks e(σV ,YAgev ) ?= e(g1gdv2 g˜H1(IDV )). If it holds,
7V is a designated verifier; otherwise, V is not. In this paper,
we assume that V is clear and U does not need to confirm
it. For example in the rail scenario, the verifier/station is clear
to U.
Ticket Trace. To de-anonymize a user and trace her service
requests, CV initialises a set ΩU . Given a ticket TU , CV
uses his secret key to de-anonymize U from the pseudonyms
(PV ,QV ) for IDV ∈ JU and traces the service request from
(E2V ,KV ). Finally, CV can determine U’s service requests by
recording all the identities IDV ∈ ΩU .
Proxy Key Generation. In the case that a verifier V is
unavailable, CA can authorize a proxy verifier V ′ to validate
the tag TagV in a ticket TU by issuing a re-key RKV→V′ to
V ′. RKV→V′ is generated by using both secret keys SKV and
SKV ′ . To limit the proxy verification period, a time period
TP, which is embedded in E3V during the Ticket Issuing, is
also embedded in RKV→V′so that only tickets within that TP
period can be validated by the proxy verifier. To prevent an
unauthorised verifier from claiming to be a legal proxy, the
CA or another trusted third party should broadcast the proxy
information (IDV ′) to both U and V ′. For example, in a rail
scenario, when a station V is unavailable and an alternative
plan is provided, both the user U and the proxy V ′ need to
be notified.
Proxy Ticket Validation. To verify a tag TagV on behalf of
V, V ′ sends the identity ID′V to U. U returns the tag TagV
to V ′ and proves the knowledge included in TagV . If the
proof is correct, V ′ validates TagV by using his secret key
SKV ′ and the re-key RKV←V′ . Both the user and the proxy
verifier V ′ know that V ′ is a proxy for the verifier V as
discussed above. For example, in a transport application a
public announcement would identify the alternative route and
hence the corresponding proxy verifier to the user.
C. Correctness
The correctness of our scheme and the details of the zero-
knowledge proofs of
∏1
U and
∏2
U are provided in in the full
version (see Section V and Appendix A in [30]).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security of our scheme is formally
proven.
Theorem 3: Our scheme described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig.
4, Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 is (%,  ′(`))-unforgeable if
and only if the (q, (`))-JoC-q-SDH assumption holds on the
bilinear group (e, p,G1,G2,Gτ) and H1,H2 and H3 are secure
cryptographic hash functions, where % is the number of ticket
issuing queries made by the adversary A, % < q and (`) ≥
( p−qp + 1p + p−1p3 ) ′(`).
Proof (Sketch): The unforgeability of our scheme is
due to the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature [38]. The
strategy used to prove the unforgeability of our scheme is as
follows. If there exists an adversary A which can break the
unforgeability of our scheme, we can construct an algorithm
B which can use A to break the JoC-q-SDH assumption.
Let f (x) = ∏q−1
i=1 (x + pii) =
∑q−1
i=0 θi x
i where pii
R← Zp for
i = 1, 2, · · · , q−1. Given (g, gx, · · · , gxq , g, gx) ∈ Gq+11 ×G22, let
g˜ = g f (x) =
∏q−1
i=0 (gx
i )θi and g˜x = ∏q−1
i=0 (gx
i+1 )θi . B sets the
public key of the ticket issuer I as (YI = g˜x, Y˜I = gx), an thus
implicitly sets the secret key of I as xi = x. In our scheme, a
ticket is a BBS+ signature on the selected services (IDV ∈ JU ),
pseudonyms ((PV ,QV )IDV ∈JU ), authentication tags ((E1V , E2V ,
E3V ,KV )IDV ∈JU ) and auxiliary information (Text1 and Text2).
When the adversary A makes a ticket issuing query, a ticket
is generated by using the technique deveoped in the proof
of BBS+ signature [38]. For other queries, B first generates
secret keys for CA,V and CV, and then uses them to respond
A’s queries. Since the unforgeability of BBS+ signature was
reduced to JoC-q-SDH assumption, B can use A to break the
JoC-q-SDH assumptions if A can forge a ticket.
The formal proof of Theorem 3 is presented in the full
version (see Section VI in [30]).
Theorem 4: Our scheme described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4,
Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 is  ′(`)-unlinkable if and only
if the (`)-DaBDH assumption holds on the bilinear group (e,
p,G1,G2,Gτ), H1, H2 and H3 are secure cryptographic hash
functions, and H2 is a random oracle, where  ′(`) ≥  (`)2e(1+qVA) ,
e ≈ 2.71 is the natural logarithm, qVA is the number of
ticket verifiers selected by A to query the Ticket-Verifier-Reg
oracle.
Proof (Sketch): The unlinkability of our scheme is due
to the security and anonymity of the Boneh-Franklin IBE
scheme [15]. The strategy used to prove the unlinkability of
our scheme is as follows. If there exists an adversary A which
can break the unlinkability of our scheme, we can construct
an algorithm B which can use A to break the DaBDH
assumption. Given (g, g, ga, gb, gc, gb, gc,Υ), B selects α, γ, γ1,
γ2, γ3, γ4, γ5
R← Zp , and computes g˜ = gγ, g1 = gγ1 , g2 = gγ2 ,
g3 = g
γ3 , ϑ1 = gγ4 , ϑ5 = gγ5 , YA = gα, Y˜A = (gb)γ. B selects
two hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0,
1}`′ and sets H2 as a random oracle defined in [15]. B sets
the public parameters as PP = (e, p,G1,G2,Gτ, g˜, g, g1, g2, g3,
g, ϑ1, ϑ2,YA, Y˜A,H1,H3), an thus implicitly sets the secret key of
CA as MSK = (α, b). We suppose that both I and CV cannot
be corrupted by A as each of them can link the services in a
ticket. B sets the secret-public key pairs of I and CV to be
(xi, (YIY˜I )) and (xcv,YCV ), respectively, where xi, xcv R← Zp ,
YI = gxi , Y˜I = gxi and YCV = gxcv . When A makes a H2 query
on an identity IDV , B responses A with a value H2(IDV ) by
using the technique developed in [15] where gc is used. When
A makes a registration query for a verifierV, B first generates
a secret key SKV for V by using the key generation technique
introduced in [15], and then generates a BBS+ signature σV
on H2(IDV ) by using the secret key α. B responses A with
(SKV , σV ). When A makes registration queries for I and CV,
B generates BBS+ signatures σI on YI and σCV on YCV by
using α, and responds A with ((YI, Y˜I ), σI ) and (YCV , σCV ),
respectively. When A makes a registration query on a user U
with public key YU , B responses A a BBS+ signature on YU
by using α. WhenA makes a ticket issuing query, B responses
A with a BBS+ signature on the pseudonyms, authentication
tags, and auxiliary information by using I’s secret key xi .
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CA runs BG(1`) → (e, p,G1,G2,Gτ) with e : G1 × G2 → Gτ . Let g˜, g¯, g1, g2, g3 be generators of G1 and g be generators
of G2. Suppose that H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp , H2 : {0, 1} → G2 and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`′ (`′ ≤ `) are cryptographic hash
functions. CA selects α, β, R← Zp and ϑ1, ϑ2 R← G2. CA computes YA = gα and Y˜A = g˜β . The master secret key is
MSK = (α, β) and the public parameters are PP = (e, p,G1,G2,Gτ, g˜, g¯, g1, g2, g3, g, ϑ1, ϑ2,YA, Y˜A,H1,H2,H3).
Fig. 2: Setup Algorithm
Ticket-Issuer-Reg
(I(xi,YI, Y˜I, IDI, PP) ↔ CA(MSK, PP))
Ticket Issuer: I Central Authority: CA
Select xi
R← Zp and compute YI = g˜xi , Y˜I = gxi
The secret-public key pair is (xi,YI, Y˜I ). IDI ,YI ,Y˜I−−−−−−−→ Select di, ei R← Zp and compute
Verify: e(σI,YAgei ) ?= e(g1gdi2 YI, g)
σI ,di,ei←−−−−−− σI = (g1gdi2 YI )
1
α+ei .
Keep the credential as CredI = (di, ei, σI ) Store (IDI,YI, Y˜I, (di, ei, σI )).
Ticket-Verifier-Reg(V(IDV , PP) ↔ CA(MSK, PP))
Ticket-Verifier: V Central Authority: CA
IDV−−−→ Select dv, ev R← Zp and compute
Verify: e(σV ,YAgev ) ?= e(g1gdv2 g˜H1(IDV ), g);
σV ,dv,ev←−−−−−−−
SKV
σV = (g1gdv2 g˜H1(IDV ))
1
α+ev ,
e(g˜, SKV ) ?= e(Y˜A,H2(IDV )); SKV = H2(IDV )β .
Keep the credential as CredV = (rv, ev, σV ) and Store (IDV , (dv, ev, σV ), SKV ).
the secret key as SKV .
User-Reg(U(xu,YU, IDU, PP) ↔ CA(MSK, PP))
User: U Central Authority: CA
Select xu
R← Zp , and compute YU = g˜xu
This secret-public key pair is (xu,YU ) IDU,YU−−−−−−→ Select du, eu R← Zp and compute
Verify: e(σU,YUgeu ) ?= e(g1gdu2 YU, g)
σU,du,eu←−−−−−−− σU = (g1gdu2 YU )
1
α+eu
Keep the credential as CredU = (du, eu, σU ). Store (IDU,YU, (du, eu, σU ))
Central-Verifier-Reg(CV(xcv,YCV , IDCV , PP) ↔ CA(MSK, PP))
Central Verifier: CV Central Authority: CA
Select xcv
R← Zp , and compute YCV = g˜xcv .
The secret-public key pair is (xcv,YCV ) IDCV ,YCV−−−−−−−−−→ Select dcv, ecv R← Zp and compute
Verify: e(σcv,YAgecv ) ?= e(g1gdcv2 YCV , g)
σCV ,dcv,ecv←−−−−−−−−−− σCV = (g1gdcv2 YCV )
1
α+ecv
Keep the credential as CredCV = (dcv, ecv, σCV ) Store (IDCV ,YCV , (dcv, ecv, σCV ))
Fig. 3: Registration Algorithm
When A makes a ticket trace query, B uses CV’s secret key
xcv to decrypt (E2V ,KV ), and responds A with the identities
of verifiers included in the ticket. When A makes a proxy
key generation query on (V,V ′), B responds A with a re-key
RV→V′ by using the secret keys SKV and SKV ′ recorded in the
hash table Hlist2 , and stores it into a table PQ. When A makes
a proxy ticket validation query, A responses A the identities
of verifiers included in the ticket by using the re-key recorded
in the table PQ. After queries, A outputs two pseudonym-
verifier pairs ((P∗V0,Q∗V0 ), IDV ∗0 ) and ((P∗V1,Q∗V1 ), IDV ∗1 ) with the
limitations: (1) both V∗0 and V
∗
1 are not corrupted by A; and
(2) both RKV∗0→V∗1 and RKV∗1→V∗0 are not in the table PQ.
B randomly selects ((PV ∗ρ ,QV ∗ρ ), IDV ∗ρ ) where ρ ∈ {0, 1}. B
embeds ga into the challenged authentication tag (E1
V ∗ρ
, E2
V ∗ρ
) by
using the challenged ciphertext generation technique in [15].
E3
V ∗ρ
and KV ∗ρ are generated by using xcv . The signature on
the pseudonym, authentication tag and auxiliary information is
generated by using xi . B sends the challenged ticket T∗U to A.A outputs his guess ρ′ on ρ. If ρ′ = ρ, B can use A to break
the DaBDH assumption since the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme
is secure and anonymous under the DaBDH assumption [15].
The probability is obtained by using the calculation method
introduced in [15].
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Suppose that JU is U’s service set consisting of the identities IDV of ticket verifiers and the central verifier IDCV .
User: U Ticket Issuer: I
Compute AU = g1g
du
2 YU .
Select y1, y2, y3
R← Zp and
compute y4 = 1y1 , σ¯U = σ
y1
U , Verify
∏1
U and e(σ¯U,YA) ?= e(σ˜U, g).
y = du − y2y4, A¯U = Ay1U g−y22 , Select ru
R← Zp , and compute RU = g¯ru .
σ˜U = σ¯
−eu
U A
y1
U (= σ¯αU ), (kv = For IDV ∈ JU , select tv,wv, zv
R← Zp , and compute
H1(y3 | |IDV ), PV = YUY kvCV , DV = H3(RU | |IDV ), E1V = e(Y˜A,H2(IDV ))tv ,
QV = g˜kv )IDV ∈JU . E2V = g˜tv , E3V = (ϑ1ϑH1(TP | |Text1
a)
2 )tv ,
Compute the proof
∏1
U :
σ¯U,σ˜U, A¯U,JU,
∏1
U−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
((PV ,QV )IDV ∈JU )
KV = g˜H1(IDV )Y tvCV , sv = H1(PV | |QV | |E1V | |E2V | |E3V
PoK{(xu, du, eu, σU, y, y1, y2, y4, | |KV | |Text2b) and ZV = (g1gwv2 gsv3 )
1
xi+zv .
(kv)IDV ∈JU ) : σ˜UA¯U = σ¯
−eu
U g
y2
2 The authentication tag is TagV = ((PV ,QV ), (E1V ,
∧ g−11 = A¯−y4U gy2 g˜xu ∧ (PV = E2V , E3V ,KV ,Text1,Text2), (sv,wv, zv, ZV )),
g˜xuY kv
CV
∧QV = g˜kv )IDV ∈JU } where sv is the serial numbers of TagV .
Select w, z
R← Zp and compute
s = H1(s1 | |s2 | | · · · | |s |JU |) and Z = (g1gw2 gs3)
1
xi+z
where s is the serial number of the ticket.
For IDV ∈ JU , verify RU,TU←−−−−− The ticket is: TU =
{(DV ,TagV )|IDV ∈ JU} ∪ {(s,
DV
?
= H3(RU | |IDV ), w, z, Z)
}
.
sv
?
= H1(PV | |QV | |E1V | |E2V | |E3V | |KV| |Text2).
s ?= H1(s1 | |s2 | | · · · | |s |JU |),
e(ZV , Y˜Igzv ) ?= e(g1gwv2 gsv3 , g).
and e(Z, Y˜Igz) = e(g1gw2 gs3, g)
Keep (x3, RU ) secret.
aText1 specifies the travel time and other information required by the proxy verification.
bText2 consists of the system version information and all other information which can be used by verifiers to validate the ticket, e.g. valid period,
ticket type, etc.
Fig. 4: Ticket Issuing Algorithm
Ticket-Validation (U(xu,TagV , PP) ↔ V(IDV , PP))
User: U Ticket verifier: V (IDV ∈ JU )
Compute DV = H3(RU | |IDV ) IDV←−−− Initialize a table TV .
and search (DV ,TagV ).
Compute kv = H1(y3 | |IDV )
and the proof:
∏2
U : If (sv,wv, zv, ZV ) ∈ TV , abort; otherwise, add (sv,wv, zv, ZV ) in
PoK{(xu, zv) : PV = g˜xuY kvCV ∧
∏2
U,TagV−−−−−−−−→ TV and go to the next step.
QV = g˜kv }. Check:
(1) The correctness of
∏2
U ;
(2) sv
?
= H1(PV | |QV | |E1V | |E2V | |E3V | |KV | |Text2);
(3) e(E2V , SKV )
?
= E1V ;
(4) e(ZV ,YIgzv ) ?= e(g1gwv2 gsv3 , g).
If (1), (2), (3) and (4) hold, the ticket is valid; otherwise, it is invalid.
Fig. 5: Ticket Validation Algorithm
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Ticket-Trace(xcv,TU, PP)
Given a ticket TU , CV works as follows:
(1) Let ΩU = {}. For each TagV in TU :
a) Compute: YU =
PV
QxcvV
and gH1(IDV ) = KV(E2V )xcv
; b) Look up gH1(IDV ) and V’s identity.
Check:
(c1) sv
?
= H1(PV | |QV | |E1V | |E2V | |E3V | |KV | |Text1); (c2) e(ZV ,YIgzv )
?
= e(g1gwv2 gsv3 , g);
(d) If (c1) and (c2) hold, set ΩU = ΩU ∪ {IDV }; otherwise abort.
(e) Verify YU remains the same for all tags.
(2) s ?= H1(s1 | |s2 | | · · · | |s |JU |);
(3) e(Z, Y˜Igz) ?= e(g1gw2 gs3, g).
If (1), (2) and (3) hold, CV can determine that the service information of U with public key YU is: JU = ΩU ; otherwise,
the trace has failed.
Fig. 6: Ticket Trace Algorithm
Proxy-Key-Generation (V(IDV ) ↔ CA(α, IDV , IDV ′))
Verifier: V ′ Central Verifier: CA
If there is a disruption on the verifier V and users should go through verifier V ′.
CA works as follows:
(1) check the registration information and find (IDV , (dv, ev, σV ), SKV ) and
(IDV ′, (dv′, ev′, σV ′), SKV ′);
(2) choose βv
R← Zp and compute RK1 = g˜βv , RK2 = (ϑ1ϑH1(TP | |Text1)2 )βv · SKVSKV ′
Keep RKA→A′ .
RKA→A′←−−−−−−− which is bound with the time period TP and system requirements. The re-key is
RKA→A′ = (RK1, RK2).
CA publishes the proxy information (IDV , IDV ′).
Fig. 7: Proxy Key Generation Algorithm
Proxy-Ticket-Validation (U(xu,TagV , PP) ↔ V ′(IDV ′, SKV ′, RKA→A′, PP))
User: U Ticket verifier: V ′ (IDV ′ < JU )
Compute DV = H2(CU | |IDV ) IDV ′←−−−− Initialize a table TV ′ .
and search (DV ,TagV ).
Compute kv = H1(zu | |IDV )
and the proof:
∏2
U :
PoK{(xu, zv) : PV = g˜xuY kvCV ∧
∏2
U,TagV−−−−−−−−→ If (sv,wv, zv, ZV ) ∈ TV ′ , abort; otherwise, add (sv,wv, zv, ZV ) in
QV = g˜zv }. TV ′ and go to the next step.
Compute:
Θ1 = RK2 · SKV ′ = (ϑ1ϑH1(TP | |Text1)2 )βv · H2(IDV )α and
Θ2 =
e(E2V ,Θ1)
e(RK1,E3V ,)
.
Check:
(1) The correctness of
∏2
U ; (2) sv
?
= H1(PV | |QV | |E1V | |E2V | |E3V | |KV | |
Text2); (3) Θ2 ?= E1V ; (4) e(ZV ,YIgzv )
?
= e(g1gwv2 gsv3 , g).
If (1), (2), (3) and (4) hold, the ticket is valid; otherwise, it is invalid.
Note: To prevent double spend a tag/ticket: (1) a central server/database is required to store the verification records and
can be accessed by any verifier in the systems; or (2) V should send the verification records on the disruption day to V ′
and V ′ should send back the proxy verification records on the disruption day to V.
Fig. 8: Proxy Ticket Validation Algorithm
11
The formal proof of Theorem 4 is presented in in the full
version (see Section VI in [30]).
Theorem 5: Our scheme described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4,
Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 is (%, (`))-traceable if the
JoC-q-SDH assumption holds on the bilinear group (e, p,G1,
G2,Gτ) with the advantage at most 1(`), the DL assumption
holds on the group G1 with the advantage at most 2(`), and
H1,H2 and H3 are secure cryptographic hash functions, where
(`) = max
{
1(`)
2 ( p−qp + 1p + p−1p3 ),
2(`)
2
}
, % is the total number
of ticket issuing queries made by A and % < q.
Proof (Sketch): The strategy used to prove the traceability
of our scheme is derived from the group signature scheme [40]
and is as follows. Each pseudonym is an EIGamal encryption
of a user’s public key under the CA’s public key and (E2V ,
KV ) included in an authentication tag is the encryption of the
verifier V’s identity under the CA’s public key. Furthermore,
a ticket in our scheme is a BBS+ signature on the on (IDV ∈
JU ), pseudonyms ((PV ,QV )IDV ∈JU ), authentication tags ((E1V ,
E2V , E
3
V ,KV )IDV ∈JU ) and auxiliary information (Text1,Text2).
If A can generate a ticket which cannot be traced to the real
user, the following two types of forgers are considered. Type-
I forger outputs a ticket which includes a new pseudonym
which has not been used to buy a ticket. Type-II forger outputs
a ticket which includes a pseudonym which has been used
to buy a ticket but can be traced to a different user. If the
Type-I forger succeeds, B can use A to break the JoC-q-SDH
assumption due to the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature
scheme as A forges a BBS+ signature. For the Type-II forger,
when buying a ticket, A needs to generates a proof of the
knowledge included in the pseudonym. If the Type-II forger
succeeds, B can use it to break the DL assumption by using
the rewinding technique.
The proof of Theorem 5 is presented in the full version (see
Section VI in [30]).
Notably, other entities including the CA, verifiers V and
users U cannot trace a user’s services even if they collude.
Because, for each selected service, a user associates it with
a pseudonym which is an EIGamal encryption of her public
key under the CV’s public key. Moreover, each authentication
tag consists of a Boneh-Franklin IBE encryption [15] for the
verifier and an EIGamal encryption of the verifier’s identity
under the CV’s public key. Therefore, no entity can link a
user’s services by using her pseudonyms and authentication
tags, except the CV. This property is very important to protect
users’ privacy and trace users if required.
VII. BENCHMARKING
In this section we evaluate the performance of our scheme.
The source code of the scheme’s implementation is available
at [41] and its performance has been measured on a Dell
Inspiron Latitude E5270 laptop with an Intel Core i7-6600U
CPU, 1TB SSD and 16GB of RAM running Fedora 28.
The implementation makes use of bilinear maps defined over
elliptic curves as well as other cryptographic primitives. For
the bilinear maps, we used the JPBC library [42] wrapper for
the C-based implementation of the PBC libraries [43] while
bouncycastle [44] provides the other cryptographic primitives
required by our scheme. Note that the implementation by Han
et al. [8] was based on a Java implementation.
Recall from Section IV that our scheme requires a Type III
bilinear map, e : G1×G2 → Gτ . The PBC library [43] provides
such an instances in the form of the “Type F” pairing which
is based on the elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + b. The order of
groups G1, G2 and Gτ is determined by the group of points
on the elliptic curve, #E(Fq) = p. Note that the Type F curve
is a pairing-friendly Barreto-Naehrig (BN) elliptic curve [45].
In our implementation, we instantiate the Type F curve using
rBits = 256 and rBits = 638 where rBits indicates the
number of bits needed to represent the prime p.
These bit sizes were chosen to follow the default values
specified in the ECC-DAA standard [46] for these curves.
Notably, there have been recent attacks [47], [48] against BN
curves which reduced of the security of an implementation
based on the 256-bit curve. However, the 638-bit curve is still
considered to be secure.
For the hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp , H2 : {0, 1}∗ →
G2 and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`′ (`′ < `) required by our scheme
(see Fig 2), we used SHA − 256 for both H1 and H3 while
for H2 (the random oracle hash function), we used SHA −
256 and the “newRandomElementfromHash()" method in the
JPBC library to construct an element of G2.
A. Timings
Table III shows the results of the computational time spent
in those phases of our scheme that required more complex
computations (i.e. some form of verification using bilinear
maps or generation of zero knowledge proofs). The timings
shown have been calculated as the average over 50 iterations.
The set-up phase is a one off process run by the CA and
only takes 233ms for rBits = 256 or 971ms for rBits = 638.
During the registration phase of the protocol, the generation
of credentials by the CA for the central verifier, CV, takes the
most computational effort (8ms and 42ms) as this involves the
creation of two credentials. The first credential is equivalent
to creating a user credential while the second one is the
equivalent of creating a credential for a designated verifier.
Similarly, the verification of the CV’s credentials requires
the most computational effort (150ms or 782ms for 256 bits
and 638 bits respectively). Note that because of this, it is
unsurprising that the timings for a user and a verifier in this
phase add up to almost the exact number for the CV.
The ticket issuing phase of our implementation is also rea-
sonably fast when rBits = 256. For example, when requesting
4 services, the whole process takes ≈ 646ms, 44ms to generate
the request, 291ms to produce the ticket and 311ms to verify
that the ticket is valid. Even when increasing the field size
to 638 bits, the whole issuing process takes ≈ 3243ms of
which 1432ms is spent on the actual ticket generation by the
issuer. Note that a user can pre-compute her ticket request thus
shortening the interaction with the issuer by 44ms or 195ms
for 256-bits and 638-bits respectively). The issuer, on the other
hand, can also pre-compute some values as part of the ticket
issuing process (e.g. DV , E1V , E
2
V , KV and parts of ZV , cf.
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TABLE III
BENCHMARK RESULTS (IN MS)
Protocol phase Entity rBits = 256 rBits = 638
Set-up - Central Authority (CA)
initialise the system CA 233 971
Registration - Issuer (I)
generate credentials CA 3 14
verify credentials Issuer 53 280
Registration - User (U)
generate credentials CA 3 14
verify credentials User 52 266
Registration - Verifiers (V)
generate credentials CA 6 28
verify credentials Verifier 101 520
Registration - Central Verifier (CV)
generate credentials CA 8 41
verify credentials Central Verifier 150 782
Ticket Issuing (4 services + CV = 5 tags)
generate ticket request User 44 195
generate ticket Issuer 291 1432
verify ticket User 311 1616
Ticket Validation - Verifier (V)
send tag & proof User 4 20
verify proof & tag Verifier 81 421
Proxy Verification - Proxy Verifier (V′)
generate re-key CA 5 22
verify proof & tag Proxy Validation 105 545
Ticket Trace (5 tags) - Central Verifier (CV)
Send ticket & proof User 4 20
verify proof & trace ticket Central Verifier 402 2083
Fig. 4). This can reduce the ticket issuing phase by another
193ms or 965ms for 256-bits and 638-bits respectively.
In the validation phase, verifying an individual tag by a
designated verifier only takes ≈ 85ms or ≈ 441ms for rBits =
256 and rBits = 638 respectively while acting as a proxy
verifier takes slightly longer (105ms or 545ms) due to the
required re-keying of the provided tag. Note, however, that
the generation of the re-key by the CA is fast (5ms or 22ms).
Evaluating the performance of a scheme is important to
demonstrate its viability. For example, in the UK, Transport
for London (TfL) [49] has a requirement for the verifica-
tion of contactless payment cards used for travelling to be
below 500ms in order to avoid congestion at ticket barriers.
Given the above performance figures and ignoring any latency
introduced by the communication channel, our ASSO with
proxy re-verification scheme is well below this requirement for
rBits = 256. For rBits = 638, only the proxy re-verification is
slightly slower (545ms) than the required 500ms. However, the
computation costs and communication cost at gates in a station
may not be so suitable for portable devices such as mobile
phone or smart card, and so this work can be seen as an initial
step. Given that our implementation has not been optimised
for any specific elliptic curve, additional improvements in
speed should be possible, and further research is needed in
this direction. However, with the developing communications
network including LTE and 5G, better transport connectivity
on trains and at stations and the power of cloud computing
and handheld devices, these computation and communication
costs might not be a such a barrier in the future.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a new ASSO with proxy re-verification scheme
is proposed which protects users’ privacy and allows a user
to authenticate herself to a designated verifier anonymously.
A central authority can authorise new verifiers to authenticate
the user in cases where proxy verification is needed. The re-
key enables the proxy verifier to verify tickets on behalf of the
original ticket verifier on the specified day. However, the proxy
verifier cannot use the re-key to verify tickets with different
travel days on behalf of the original verifier. Furthermore,
our scheme is formally treated in terms of definition, secu-
rity model and security proof and its performance has been
empirically evaluated.
This work represents one more step in the direction of
defining a scheme that provides strong security and privacy
properties in the context of smart ticketing. We constructed
our scheme using the most efficient pairing (Type-III pairing)
available, but the computation cost and communication cost
may be not suitable for portable devices, e.g. mobile phone,
smart card, tablet, etc. Further research is needed to optimise
the scheme’s construction to minimise the use of pairings in or-
der to potentially improve the efficiency of the scheme and the
associated performance of the implementation in order to align
to the requirements for verification of contactless payment
cards [49]. An alternative approach to improve performance is
to construct an ASSO with proxy re-verification scheme which
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does not rely on bilinear groups and this is an interesting area
of future work.
The rail industry is particularly focused on addressing prob-
lems associated with disruption and the issues surrounding the
sharing of passenger details. Addressing these two concerns
is challenging because of the separation of information held
by third party retailers and rail service providers. Retailers
know about passenger travel information but do not necessarily
know about events likely to affect the journey whereas rail
service providers know about service disruptions but do not
necessarily have the details to contact the passengers who
might be affected and hence cannot warn them. Our future re-
search directions will explore using the techniques presented in
this paper to facilitate privacy-preserving sharing of passenger
details between different parties in the event of disruptions.
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